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Non-Technical Summary
Following the proposal of the World Bank in the end of the 1990s, a number of Central Euro-
pean countries have extended their pay-as-you-go pension systems by a capital-market-based
element in the form of privately managed pension funds. As a result of these reforms, new
type of financial institutions – defined contribution pension funds – have been introduced in
these countries. To guarantee the security of future pensions, governments imposed regula-
tion on the investment practices and performance of the pension funds. This approach to
regulation differs from the traditional “prudent man” rules applied in a number of developed
countries. This paper presents an analysis of pension funds’ performance in Poland and
Hungary, two Central European countries characterized by strong regulation of their private
pension fund industries. The paper extends the literature which has so far mostly focused
on performance of pension fund industries facing no or only limited regulation. We find that
the performance of pension funds in the two studied countries differs. While we do not find
convincing evidence of outperformance by Polish pension funds, we find strong evidence of
underperformance by Hungarian pension funds. The results are robust to time-variation.
The paper considers possible explanations behind these findings. The results of the paper
should be of interest for policy-makers seeking to achieve optimal performance of the pension
systems and academics in the research area of pension funds.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Gema¨ß des Vorschlags der Weltbank Ende der 1990er-Jahre erweiterten mehrere zentraleu-
ropa¨ische La¨nder ihre bisherigen nach dem Umlageverfahren konzipierten staatlichen Renten-
systeme um ein kapitalmarktbasiertes Element in Form von privaten Pensionsfonds. Auf-
grund dieser Reformen entstand mit der Einfu¨hrung von beitragsorientierten Pensionskassen
eine neue Form von Finanzinstituten. Um zuku¨nftige Pensionszahlungen sicherzustellen,
wurden Regulierungsmaßnahmen fu¨r die Investitionspraxis und Performance der Pensions-
fonds eingerichtet. Diese regulatorischen Rahmenbedingungen unterscheiden sich von den
traditionellen “Prudent-Man”-Richtlinien, die in Ma¨rkten der meisten Industriestaaten ange-
wendet werden. Die vorliegende Arbeit umfasst eine Analyse der Performance von Pensions-
fonds in Polen und Ungarn, zwei zentraleuropa¨ischen La¨ndern deren private Pensionsfonds
stark reguliert sind. Diese Arbeit erweitert die einschla¨gige Literatur, die sich bis dato auf die
Performance von Pensionsfonds in wenig oder gar nicht regulierten Ma¨rkten konzentriert. Es
wird gezeigt, dass sich die Performance der Pensionsfonds in den zwei untersuchten La¨ndern
unterscheidet. Wir finden Hinweise, wenn auch keine eindeutigen Beweise, fu¨r eine Outper-
formance der polnischen Pensionsfonds. Die Underperformance ungarischer Pensionsfonds
ko¨nnen wir hingegen deutlich nachweisen. Die Ergebnisse sind robust gegen Vera¨nderungen
der Stichprobe u¨ber die Zeit. Die Studie liefert zudem mo¨gliche Erkla¨rungen fu¨r diese Ergeb-
nisse. Die Erkenntnisse der Arbeit du¨rften fu¨r Politiker, die auf eine optimale Performance
der heimischen Alterssicherungssysteme abzielen, sowie fu¨r Wissenschaftler im Bereich der
Pensionsfonds von Interesse sein.
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1 Introduction
Following the proposal of the World Bank (1994), in the end of the 1990s pay-as-you-go
pension systems in Central European (CE) countries have been complemented by a capital-
market-based element in the form of privately managed pension funds. The pension reform
aimed to facilitate accumulation of future pensions and reduce the fiscal burden resulting
from excessive pension liabilities.
Since investment in private pension funds in these countries is mandatory, investment
limits and performance regulations on pension funds’ activities were imposed to avoid losses
of contributed money and guarantee future pension payments. In addition, regulation was
expected to facilitate trust and acceptance of the new pension system, as well as to contribute
to the development of capital markets of the respective countries. The presence of such strict
investment regulations constitutes a peculiar feature of the environment, in which Central
European pension funds operate, distinguishing it from the environment of many developed
financial markets where often only the so-called “prudent man” rule applies. Poland and
Hungary – two diverse Central European countries in terms of their economic conditions
and their degree and manner of regulatory framework – are chosen to provide a basis for the
present study.
Up to our knowledge, the literature discussing pension fund performance in Central and
Eastern European countries within an asset pricing framework is scarce. Stanko (2003)
represents a notable exception in this respect. Stanko (2003) studies 21 Polish pension
funds from June 1999 to March 2003. In addition to Sharpe and Treynor ratios, he uses
several unconditional asset pricing models to estimate funds’ alphas. Stanko (2003) finds that
compared to the international results, the Polish pension industry recorded high economically
and statistically significant abnormal returns. He believes this result is to some extent due
to managers’ superior information over individual investors and their timing ability, as well
as due to factors beyond the power of the fund managers, such as bullish market and market
inefficiency. Another paper studying pension funds in Poland is written by Zalewska (2006).
However, Zalewska is concerned with the issue of the effects of enforced home bias on the
development of the Polish stock market, rather than with the performance of pension funds.
Currencies and Stability”, the seminar of the European Network on Research on Pensions (ENRSP), and the
research seminar of the Westfa¨lische Wilhelms-University, especially to Laurence Kotlikoff, Gary Burtless,
Stephen Zeldes, Roland Eisen, Tetyana Dubovyk, Janusz Brzeszczynski, Bogdan Dima, Gerry Dwyer, Jana
Riedel, Gordon Roberts, Christian Salm, Michael Schuppli, David Sondermann, Heinz-Dietrich Steinmeyer,
Yves Stevens and Marek Szczepan´ski, for helpful comments and suggestions.
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In a study on Hungarian pension funds Impavido and Rocha (2006) address a wider set
of issues pertaining to the pension reform, such as effect on capital market development,
regulation of the accumulation and payout phases and future reform agenda. Performance
of the pension funds within the new second pillar of the Hungarian pension system is therefore
only one of the issues addressed in this paper. Impavido and Rocha (2006) discuss net and
gross investment returns of the Hungarian pension funds and do not estimate funds’ excess
returns. The authors find that the average return performance of Hungarian pension funds
was rather disappointing. In some years during the period 1998-2004 the average real net
rate of return was even negative. Net rate of return in all but one year was lower than wage
growth. Also, the accumulated rate of return in Hungary appears to be lower than in Poland
and all of Latin American countries who carried out similar reform a decade earlier.
The present paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, it
provides empirical evidence on the performance of pension funds in two Central European
countries. Second, it complements the available evidence on performance of pension funds
operating in lax regulatory environments and guided by “prudent man” laws by analyzing
the performance of pension funds acting under much stricter regulations. Third, as the re-
formed pension systems in both countries are still at a relatively early stage, their regulatory
frameworks might still develop and improve. In this respect we believe that the paper’s find-
ings might be of interest for policy makers and pension fund managers in Central European
countries. Additionally, the findings of the paper might be relevant for policy makers seeking
to implement a similar system in their country.
We use monthly and quarterly data on pension fund portfolio returns, returns on local
stock and bond market indices and local Treasury bills. The data allows us to decompose
the assets under management into different asset classes. Established performance measures,
such as Sharpe ratio, Treynor ratio and Jensen’s alpha are used to evaluate funds’ perfor-
mance. To calculate Jensen’s alpha, several asset pricing models were estimated: CAPM
and Henriksson and Merton (1981) and Treynor and Mazuy (1966) timing models. In order
to account for the dynamic development of the emerging markets and the possible result-
ing time-variation in the beta-coefficients, we extend the models by time-related interaction
dummies. All models were estimated using pooled OLS estimator with Driscoll and Kraay
(1998) standard errors to correct for spatial cross-sectional and temporal dependence.
Firstly, we find that investment limits and performance regulations influence the invest-
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ment decisions of pension funds. The exact effect depends on the type of the performance
evaluation benchmark used. In Poland it leads to similar portfolio compositions of the funds
across asset classes, while in Hungary it leads to an excessive investment into government
securities. Secondly, we do not find a conclusive evidence of selectivity ability by Polish
pension fund managers. Although the estimation results of the basic CAPM show evidence
for a selectivity ability of pension fund managers in Poland when a blue-chip market index
is used as an equity market benchmark, the results can not be confirmed when a broader
market index is used to measure stock market performance. In case of Hungarian pension
funds we find a strong evidence of underperformance. Finally, we place our findings in a
broader context by comparing our results with those on pension fund performance in selected
developed markets. Given the mandatory nature of the defined-contribution pension funds
in Poland and Hungary and their substantial portion of future pensions, the performance
of pension funds in the countries is one of the key indicators for judging the success of the
pension reforms. Analysis of the pension fund portfolio composition and performance allows
policy-makers to judge about the expected and realized investment strategies by pension
fund managers and use this information for further improvement of pension fund regulation.
In these respects the present study provides further evidence on the development of the
pension reforms in the Central European countries, which might be of interest for policy
makers, fund managers and general public in these countries, as well as for the academics
studying pension systems.
2 Pension Fund Industry and Regulatory Framework
in Poland and Hungary
As pointed out by Chan-Lau (2005), the main determinants of pension funds’ investment
performance may be grouped into three categories: investment regulations, investment prac-
tices and the ability to diversify the portfolios abroad. Below we review those factors in the
context of mandatory pension funds acting on the Polish and Hungarian markets.
The first transfer of money to Polish pension funds took place on May 19, 1999. Due to
organizational, as well as financial problems, the majority of Polish pension funds started
their activity on the market in June 1999. As of October 1999, the number of active funds
rose from 15 to 21. Since 2004, due to acquisitions and a merger, it has been reduced to 15
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again. The Polish pension fund market is highly concentrated. In terms of market share,
as measured by net assets, the market can be divided into three groups: very large funds
(market share higher than 20%), large funds (market share between 5% and 20%) and small
funds (market share below 5%). In August 2007, the funds Commercial Union (27%) and
ING (23%), representing the group of largest funds, jointly held 50% of the market share.
Approximately a further quarter was held by the group of large funds that included PZU
(14%) and AIG (8%). The remaining quarter of the market was distributed between 11
small funds with market share below 5%. In August 2007 Polish pension funds held about
49 billion US-$ of net assets, amounting to 12% of the Polish GDP in 2007 (www.knf.gov.pl).
Polish pension funds constitute the second pillar of the reformed pension system. They
are defined-contribution funds. This means that the amount of future pensions accumulated
in the second pillar depends solely on returns on invested assets. Participation in the second
pillar is mandatory for individuals born after 1968 (AP Information Services (2009)). Em-
ployees transfer 7.3% of their gross salary through the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS) on
their individual accounts in the pension funds (KNF (2008)). Employees are free to choose
a fund in which to invest.
In addition to the prudent man rules, Polish pension fund managers have to follow quan-
titative investment limits regulated in the Law on Organisation and Operation of Pension
Funds from August 28, 1997. Here we focus on quantitative limits imposed on investments
in particular types of assets and do not review the regulations restricting the concentration
of holding securities of the same issuer. The overall investment in bonds and bills issued by
Treasury and National Bank of Poland is not subject to constraints. A maximum of 40%
of the accumulated assets under management may be invested in shares of domestic listed
companies, in addition, no more than 25% in investment funds. The investment in bank
deposits and foreign assets is limited to a maximum of 20% and 5%, respectively. According
to Polish law, investments into derivatives may only be permitted by the Council of Minis-
ters in exceptional cases. During the present sample period pension funds were banned from
investing in such assets. Investing into real estate is prohibited (OECD (2006)).
Table 1 provides data on the quantitative limits faced by Polish pension funds and their
actual portfolio composition for the period between April 2002 and August 2007. We provide
the average of all pension funds’ portfolio shares. The quantitative regulations are deemed
responsible for the distribution of shares versus bonds in the funds’ portfolios of about 31%
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to 64%. The remaining marginal fraction of the portfolios is dispersed across other asset
categories. Table 1 reveals that Polish pension funds diversify less than they are allowed by
the quantitative investment limits. In particular, the fraction of investment in foreign assets
is substantially lower than the legal limit of 5% (www.knf.gov.pl). Diverse reasons might
lead to this outcome. An analysis of the underlying portfolios of individual funds shows,
that only the four largest funds invest in foreign assets. Smaller funds might refrain from
investing abroad due to high information costs associated with such investments and a lack
of experience.
Table 1 about here
To guarantee future pension payments, the pension funds are required to achieve a mini-
mum rate of return on their investments. The Polish law defines this mandatory minimum as
“the rate of return lower by 50% than the weighted average rate of all funds established for
a given period, or the rate of return four percentage points lower than the aforesaid average,
whichever is lower”. The measure is calculated and announced on a quarterly basis for the
previous 36-month period. A rate below the required threshold should be made up from
pension funds’ reserve account1. If these assets will not suffice to cover the deficit, it has to
be financed by the so-called Guarantee Fund, which was introduced to secure future pension
payments2 (www.knf.gov.pl). The regulatory framework does not include a definition of a
certain investment policy. Thus, pension funds in Poland are free to choose their investment
strategy.
Mandatory pension funds in Hungary were introduced in January 1998 as a second tier
within the new three-tier pension system (World Bank (2007)). Four funds started their
activity on the market during the first quarter of 1998. Since 2001 18 mandatory private
pension funds have been active on the market. By the end of 2007 they managed 11.5 billion
US-$ of assets (at market prices), which accounted for 7.8% of Hungarian GDP. The funds
had 2.8 million members (www.pszaf.hu). The citizens covered by the second pillar include
1Pension funds shall transfer funds to a reserve account amounting up to 0.005% of the value of the
managed net assets of the fund. If the fund fails to serve the reserve account they are charged a fine by the
supervision authority.
2Such performance regulations in combination with the high concentration of the pension fund industry
in Poland can be seen as reasons for herding behavior by Polish pension funds and for similar composition of
the funds’ portfolios. Voronkova and Bohl (2005) investigate this typical feature of the Polish pension fund
market in detail.
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new labor entrants below the age of 42 and those who opted to join the new system. The
employees contribute 7% of their taxable income towards the second pillar pension. As in
case of Poland, employees are free to choose in which fund to invest. The concentration of
the Hungarian pension fund market is similar to the one in Poland. At the end of 2005 one
very large and four large Hungarian pension funds, holding about 80% of assets, dominated
the market, whilst the very large fund held 25% on its own. The remaining 20% of the
market was held by 13 small funds. The oligopolistic structure of the Polish and Hungarian
pension fund markets is similar to the one in the UK, where 50% of voluntary pension fund
assets were held by five managing houses in 2002 (Blake and Timmermann (2002)).
Investment limits in Hungary are somewhat less strict than those in Poland. Holdings
in government bonds and bank deposits are not limited. Investment in domestic stocks and
investment funds is limited to 50% each, investment in foreign assets is limited to 30% and
investment in real estate may reach a maximum of 10%. It is prohibited for pension fund
managers to invest in loans (OECD (2006)). Despite the less restrictive limits, Hungarian
pension fund managers diversify their portfolios even less, which becomes apparent from the
data provided in Table 1. More than 75% of assets are invested in government bonds, while
only 10% of assets are held in stocks. The large proportion of government bonds in the
pension funds’ portfolios is likely to be caused by the performance regulation being linked to
the performance of Hungarian government bonds. Pension fund managers, striving to meet
the performance requirements, avoid investing in equities, which are associated with more
risk. As is the case of Polish pension funds, only minor fractions of the overall portfolios are
invested in foreign assets.
In order to ensure the security of future pensions the Hungarian Financial Supervisory
Authority (HFSA) applies the following regulations to pension funds’ performance. Funds
are expected to achieve a minimum rate of return, which is defined as 85% of the return
on long-term government bonds. Funds failing to achieve the performance target for three
consecutive years may be subject to a government enquiry. However, in contrast to Poland,
the Hungarian pension fund managers cannot be held liable for not delivering a minimum
rate of return since their assets are not kept segregated from the participants’ assets. Unlike
in Poland, pension funds in Hungary are subject to long-term performance regulations: the
pensions that they disburse should be at least at the level of 25% of a comparable public
pension benefit on the retirement at the statutory pension age. In particular, after 15
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years of participation in a pension fund, the total pension from the first and the second
pillar should reach 92% of a corresponding old-style pension. As it is the case in Poland,
restrictions regarding the investment strategies of the pension funds are not part of the
regulatory framework.
It should be pointed out that Hungarian pension funds suffer from a relatively small and
illiquid stock market. The number of stocks listed on Budapest Stock Exchange fluctuated
between 49 and 66 during the sample period. However, the five most traded shares accounted
for over 80% of the stock market capitalization and around 90% of its turnover (Budapest
Stock Exchange (2006)). This, in combination with the present investment and performance
regulations, has resulted in a very high fraction of domestic bonds in the Hungarian pension
fund portfolios, which amounted to about 70% during our sample period (HFSA (2005)).
Thus the circumstances of the Hungarian stock market, along with the investment regulation,
effectively negate the opportunity to invest up to 50% of the portfolio into equities.
Analysis of the portfolio compositions of the pension funds in the two countries shows
that pension fund managers heavily invest in government bonds. Pension funds in both
countries pursue conservative investment strategies and their investments in other allowed
financial instruments apart from government bonds are minor, particularly so in Hungary3.
3 Performance Measures
To provide a first insight into the investment performance of the pension funds and their
ranking Sharpe (1966) and Treynor (1965) ratios are calculated. While the Sharpe ratio
considers the total risk of a portfolio, the Treynor ratio takes the systematic risk into account.
A well diversified portfolio features a total risk equal to the systematic risk. Thus, through
a comparison of the two ratios, a rough estimate of the diversification capability of the
managers is possible. An identical ranking of the performance measures indicates a high
diversification capability.
Detailed information about the portfolio structure of the individual funds is available for
a limited period only, due to lack of available data. Therefore, the analysis is constrained
to established unconditional performance measures based on the CAPM. We expand the
3The trade-off between investment regulations and benefits from diversification is an important issue
discussed in the literature (Antolin et al. (2009)). However, up to our knowledge, it has not yet been
addressed in the context of CEE countries.
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models by interaction dummies for each year to consider the dynamic development of the
emerging stock markets, and the potential resulting time-variation of the beta-coefficients.
Using a stepwise reduction of the interaction-dummy coefficients we ensure that only the
significant time-effects influence the estimation. The extended Jensen (1968) regression is
given by equation (1):
rit − rft = αi + βi(rmt − rft) +
∑
$
ϕ$iδ$(rmt − rft) + it. (1)
rit is the return of pension fund i at time t, rft the risk-free rate and rmt the return
of the market portfolio. The coefficient αi indicates Jensen’s α of fund i, the coefficient
βi denotes its beta. $ is the vector of years for which the dummy variables are included
depending on the longest available time-series for fund i. ψ$i indicates the coefficient of
the time-related interaction dummy. δ$ is a dummy-variable, which takes the value of 1 for
year $ and 0 otherwise. While a positive and significant α indicates a superior risk-adjusted
performance of a fund, a negative value reports an inferior performance assuming that the
fund manager potentially does not show stock selection ability, but timing ability (Cesari
and Panetta (2002)). Stock selection ability refers to the allocation of funds’ assets within
different investment instruments, whereas market timing concerns changes of the funds’ asset
allocation across those instruments.
As was pointed out above, in addition to stocks, pension funds’ portfolios in both coun-
tries contain a significant fraction of bonds. To account for the presence of bonds in the
pension fund portfolios, we construct a capitalization-weighted market index based on eq-
uity and government bond indices. The details of the index construction are provided in
Section 4.
Jensen’s α is affected by the information available to the manager. Exclusive availability
of security-specific information leaves the measure unbiased. However, if the management
resorts to timing information its value is generally biased downwards (Cesari and Panetta
(2002)). In order to capture possible market timing ability of fund managers we apply the
approaches by Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and Merton (1981). The Treynor-
Mazuy approach is based on the idea that managers are able to predict the market trend
and the extent of future excess returns. Thus, a fund manager adapts the beta of the fund
continuously to his forecasted market trend. The fraction of the market portfolio held by
the managers increases (decreases) when they expect the general stock market to rise (fall).
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In order to capture the timing ability, Treynor and Mazuy (1966) add the squared excess
return of the market portfolio to the basic Jensen regression:
rit − rft = αi + βi(rmt − rft) + γi(rmt − rft)2 +
∑
$
ϕ$iδ$(rmt − rft) + it. (2)
γi = 0 indicates no timing ability, and γi > 0 that the manager has access to and
successfully uses timing information, while αi measures the share of the fund’s performance
achieved through selectivity. The contribution to the performance of a fund achieved by
timing ability corresponds to the product of the γ coefficient and the variance of the excess
market return σ2erm. The sum of the selection contribution and the timing contribution is
equal to the total performance. The Treynor-Mazuy approach may only detect timing ability,
when the structure of the estimated model complies with the managers’ timing ability. Using
a multi-beta-strategy or the three-factor model by Fama and French (1993) may solve this
shortcoming (Prather and Middleton (2006)).
The Henriksson-Merton approach (1981) is based on the idea that managers use forecasts
of excess market return for the following period, and adjust the beta accordingly. The
product of the excess market return and a dummy variable is added to the basic Jensen
regression:
rit − rft = αi + βi(rmt − rft) + γi(rmt − rft)Dt +
∑
$
ϕ$iδ$(rmt − rft) + it. (3)
The dummy variable Dt takes the value 0 if rmt − rft = 0 and -1 if rmt − rft ≤ 0. A
positive value of γi indicates that the manager has timing ability. The Henriksson-Merton
approach regards time-varying beta-factors of the Jensen model as evidence for timing ac-
tivity. However, instability of this risk-measure is not necessarily due to timing activities.
Another critical assumption of the approach is that managers only take the forecasted trend
of the market return into account and not the absolute level of the excess return in order to
determine the beta. The performance achieved by timing and selectivity may be biased, if
their behavior does not correspond to the assumptions of the model.
Since we are interested in the performance of the whole sector, rather than in the in-
dividual performance of the pension funds, we estimate the models using pooled ordinary
least squares (OLS). Given the small samples, pooling information across funds has the po-
tential advantage of gaining power compared to estimates based on a fund-by-fund analysis
(Chevalier and Ellison (1999)). We correct the standard errors for spatial cross-sectional and
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temporal dependence by using the method proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998).
4 Data
Our empirical investigation is based on two samples containing panel data of Polish and
Hungarian private pension funds. The sample covering portfolio returns of Polish pension
funds runs from June 1999, the time the majority of funds entered the market, to August
2007. The data for the 52-week local t-bill yield, which proxies the risk-free-rate in Poland,
is available up to April 2007. The estimations are adjusted accordingly where necessary. The
21 Polish pension funds can be classified into survived and discontinued funds. The group
of survivors, containing 15 pension funds, includes those funds active on the market during
the whole sample period4. The group of discontinued funds contains six funds entering
the market late and quitting it before the end of the sample period, respectively5. The
classification of the pension funds allows us to identify the influence of discontinued pension
funds on the aggregate results.
The returns of the pension funds, provided by Analizy Online under www.analizy.pl, are
measured as the monthly change in pension funds’ unit value. The end-of-month data of
the Polish total return index WIG and the price index WIG20 are used as proxies for the
Polish stock market portfolio. The choice of the benchmark is decisive, as it is difficult to
distinguish between benchmark inefficiency and abnormal returns due to the interdependence
between performance evaluation and the choice of the benchmark (Lehmann and Modest
(1987), Grinblatt and Titman (1994), Blake and Timmermann (2002)). The use of different
benchmarks provides a possibility to check the robustness of the estimations. Additionally,
we use the WIG20 along with the WIG, since Polish pension fund managers are known
to invest heavily in blue chips due the existing investment constraints and performance
regulation. Monthly Morgan Stanley Capital International bond index (MSCI) for Poland,
a total return index, is used as a benchmark for the returns on bonds held by the funds.
The risk-free rate, as well as the benchmark indices, are obtained from Thomson Financial
Datastream.
4Pekao and Allianz, entered the market only in August 1999 and September1999, respectively. As they
did not leave the market until August 2008, they are classified into the group of survived pension funds.
5Arka, Kredyt Banku, Epoka and Rodzina entered the market late, and quit the market prior to 2005.
Pioneer and ego entered the market already in 1999; however, they quit the market already prior to 2003.
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The data on returns of Hungarian private pension funds are provided by the Hungarian
Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA). The dataset contains quarterly annualized net
rates of returns of 18 mandatory private pension funds from the first quarter of 1998 until
the last quarter of 2004. Due to the fact that some pension funds only started their activity
on the market after the first quarter of 1998 and due to additional missing values, the set of
data is fragmentary. The names of the pension funds are not provided by the HFSA. Instead,
pension funds are identified by numbers. As a proxy for the local risk-free-rate, we use the
Hungarian one-year t-bill rate. The market portfolio benchmark is proxied by the Budapest
stock index (BUX). In order to incorporate a benchmark for the returns on bonds held by
the funds, the total return MSCI bond index for Hungary is used. The Hungarian t-bill-rate
is obtained from Global Financial Data (www.globalfinancialdata.com). The BUX and the
MSCI indices are obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream. For the purpose of the
empirical analysis continuously compounded rates of return are used.
We construct a capitalization-weighted market benchmark index which is a combination
of the domestic government bond and equity indices. The weights of the bond and equity
components were calculated using the monthly (in case of Poland) and quarterly (in case of
Hungary) portfolio-level data on holdings of bonds and equities by pension funds.
5 Empirical Findings and Comparison with Existing
Literature
Sharpe and Treynor ratios for the Polish pension funds are presented in Table 2. As the
returns of the pension funds are similar to the level of the t-bill rates, the absolute values of
the performance ratios are small. The ratios are mainly positive and have similar rankings.
Negative Sharpe and Treynor ratios are due to a negative total return of the corresponding
pension fund. Indeed, the ranking of the Treynor and Sharpe ratios differ in some cases,
but those minor differences may be neglected since the correlation between the ranking
values is high. This result suggests that the pension fund portfolios are well diversified. By
comparing the survived and the discontinued funds it becomes apparent that all discontinued
funds performed worse than the survived funds. The Treynor ratios based on the WIG and
the WIG20 are highly correlated, indicating robust results.
Table 2 about here
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All Sharpe ratios and a substantial number of Treynor ratios of Hungarian pension funds,
presented in Table 3, are negative. All the negative Treynor ratios for Hungarian pension
funds are due to negative total returns earned by these funds, rather than negative betas.
All of the positive Treynor ratios are caused by negative total returns and negative betas
of the corresponding funds. A negative β-factor results from a negative covariance between
the excess return of the pension fund and the excess return of the market portfolio. This
indicates a counter-cyclical investment strategy. It should be pointed out that the rankings
of the Sharpe and Treynor ratios for most Hungarian pension fund differ substantially. This
suggests that the majority of Hungarian pension fund portfolios are not well diversified.
The considerable difference in Polish and Hungarian Sharpe and Treynor ratios indicates
that Polish pension funds perform better than Hungarian ones, despite facing a relatively
stricter regulatory framework. We consider possible explanations behind the relative under-
performance of Hungarian pension funds later in this section.
Table 3 about here
The estimated performance measures for Polish pension funds based on the CAPM, are
presented in Table 4 in Panel (A)6. According to the single-index model, the funds outperform
the market by 2.94% per annum using the capitalization-weighted market index based on
the WIG20 and the MSCI-bond index. If the market index is based on the WIG and the
MSCI-bond index, the results show no significant outperformance of Polish pension funds.
As the WIG does account for dividends, while the WIG20 does not, the difference in the
estimates is not only due to the included stocks.
The results for the Treynor-Mazuy and Henriksson-Merton model in Panel (A) suggest
that Polish pension fund managers do not appear to possess any timing ability. However,
when the market benchmark is based on the WIG20, both models indicate selectivity ability.
Thus, pension fund managers show selectivity ability with respect to blue chip stocks and
6Transaction costs, operational costs and profit margins might influence the performance of pension funds.
The cost structure is similar in Poland and Hungary in that operating fees are charged as a percentage of
contributions to the pension fund and management fees are charged on the amount assets under management.
It should be pointed out that the full extent of fees is often not transparent to the consumers in these countries
(Impavido and Rocha (2006), Stanko (2003)). However, in the present paper we focus on the performance
of pension funds in the countries, leaving the comparison of their overall economic efficiency for further
research.
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show no such ability concerning stocks of smaller companies. These findings are in line with
the fact that blue chips constitute a significant proportion of the funds’ portfolios. Such
portfolio structure is attributed to the existence of minimum required rate of return and the
resulting security orientation of the managers (KNF (2007)).
The estimation results for the groups of survived and discontinued Polish pension funds
in Panel (B) and (C) of Table 4 support our findings by the Sharpe and the Treynor ratio
evidencing a worse performance of discontinued pension funds. While the estimated perfor-
mance measures for survived pension funds are similar to those of the whole market, the
performance measures of the discontinued funds are somewhat different. While discontinued
funds also show positive alphas, their alphas are generally lower and statistically insignificant
in comparison with those of the survived funds. In addition to the lacking selectivity abil-
ity, the results of both timing models deny the managers of discontinued funds any timing
ability.
The empirical findings on the performance of Polish pension funds are therefore mixed.
While we find evidence of selectivity ability when WIG20 is used as a benchmark for the
equity market, the results do not hold when we use the broad-market index WIG as the
benchmark. In the latter case, alphas decline in magnitude and cease to be statistically
significant. This result is valid not only for the survived pension funds, but also for all
pension funds. Thus this finding is not affected by the survivorship bias. A comparison of
the survived and discontinued funds shows differences in their performances as reflected in
the lower alphas for discontinued pension funds.
Our estimation results for the Polish pension fund market differ somewhat from those
of Stanko (2003). The author finds statistically significant alphas for several unconditional
models that range between 3 and 4.3% per annum. As it was mentioned above, we only find
statistically significant alphas when WIG20 is used as a benchmark for the equity market
performance. We also do not find evidence for timing ability detected by Stanko (2003).
The differences in the results can be to some extent explained the longer sample used in
our study and by somewhat differing methodology as Stanko (2003) does not account for
time-variability in beta coefficients.
Table 4 about here
Table 5 shows the estimation results for Hungarian pension funds. The estimated coeffi-
cients of the Jensen model demonstrate that Hungarian pension funds were not able to beat
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the market in the observed period. In fact, they underperform the market by 5% per annum.
In case of the Jensen model the beta-coefficient is not significantly different from zero. Since
the coefficients of the interaction-dummies 1998-2001 are significantly different from zero7,
this result indicates that the fund returns are not correlated with the market in the baseline-
year. The estimations of the timing models lead to a minor increase in the α estimates
in absolute terms compared to the Jensen model, still indicating that Hungarian pension
funds were not able to outperform the market. The estimation results for the Treynor-
Mazuy model indicates that Hungarian pension fund managers possess timing-ability, as the
γ-coefficient is significantly different from zero. However, the Henriksson-Merton model does
not detect any timing-ability. As time-variation in the beta coefficients is captured by the
time-related interaction-dummies, the time-varying beta cannot be due to timing activities
of the managers.
Table 5 about here
A number of reasons may be cited to explain this evidence of underperformance by Hun-
garian pension funds. The relatively short sample period and the dynamics of the t-bill rate
might lead to the negative and insignificant α-estimates. Unfavorable monetary and fiscal
conditions over the sample period exerted pressure on the government securities markets
and caused the Hungarian t-bill rate to be higher than in other Central European coun-
tries8. The use of government bond yields as a benchmark by the Hungarian performance
regulation further clearly affects the portfolio composition, as it keeps managers from invest-
ing into assets other than bonds. Most importantly, Hungarian pension fund managers face
an illiquid and rather small stock market, with only a handful of liquid securities. During
the sample period the number of securities listed on Budapest Stock exchange fluctuated
between 46 and 66. The number of securities in BUX, the blue chip index, ranged from 13
to 20 (Budapest Stock Exchange, http://www.bse.hu/). This significantly limits managers’
diversification opportunities. Finally, the pension fund legislative framework itself has been
subject to numerous changes, providing additional uncertainties for managers and partici-
pants (World Bank (2007)). Therefore, the small and illiquid stock market, the design of
fund performance benchmark, the adverse macroeconomic developments and the unstable
7Results for interaction-dummy-coefficients are not reported, but available upon request.
8The macroeconomic situation in Hungary is discussed in IMF (2006) and AKK (2004).
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regulatory framework are all likely to have contributed to the under-performance of pension
funds in Hungary.
It should be pointed out that the reported evidence on underperformance by pension
funds is not unique in literature. Several studies of pension funds in developed markets
find that they may slightly underperform market benchmarks. For example, Blake and
Timmermann (2002) analyze the portfolio composition and performance of UK pension
funds during 1986-1994 using the Jensen regression. As UK pension fund managers face
no constraints in regard to their investment decisions they hold a larger fraction in equities
and a smaller fractions in bonds than pension funds in Poland and Hungary. Blake et al.
(2002) present a cross-sectional distribution of unconditional α-estimates, which ranges from
-4.59% per annum to 4.68% per annum. Thus, less than 50% of the observed UK pension
funds achieve a positive α. On average, UK pension funds have an α estimate of -0.047% per
annum. This indicates that UK pension funds tend to underperform the market in general.
Our findings on Polish pension funds also show that a large amount of net assets does not
necessarily guarantee the highest performance, being in line with the results of Blake et al.
(2002) and Lakonishok et al. (1992) for the UK and the US market, respectively.
Christopherson et al. (1998) studied the performance of the US pension funds, which,
like the UK pension funds, are also subject to the “prudent-man rule”. The study is based
on 185 US pension fund managers over the period between 1979 and 1990. In addition to
the basic CAPM with one explanatory variable, they also estimate time-varying conditional
alphas and betas of Ferson and Schadt (1996). They find that pension funds pursuing value-
oriented strategy show negative alphas of -3.30% when CRSP index is used as a benchmark.
Growth-oriented pension funds show negative alphas of -1.00% in case Russel style index
is used as a benchmark. Growth- and value-oriented fund groups each account for about
22% of their sample. The above-mentioned empirical results show that underperformance is
found among pension funds in the UK and US. The extent of underperformance, however, is
lower than in case of Hungarian pension funds. These findings call for further, more detailed
enquiries into the effects that various types of regulations have on pension fund performance
and into the optimal design of the financial regulation systems.
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6 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper is to investigate the performance of mandatory defined-contribution
pension funds on strictly regulated markets of Poland and Hungary and to provide a com-
parison of pension funds’ performance between these two countries. For our comparative
analysis we apply established performance measures. We find strong evidence of underper-
formance by Hungarian pension funds. Investment limits and performance regulations seem
to influence the investment decisions of pension funds in both countries. In Poland they
lead to similar portfolio composition decisions among the managers, while in Hungary they
lead to an excess investment into government securities. Additionally, the very low liquid-
ity and small size of the Hungarian equity market, along with unfavorable macroeconomic
developments which affected government bond yields, the design of the fund performance
benchmark and the instability of the regulatory framework in Hungary are possible reasons
behind the weak performance of Hungarian pension funds. Thus, the success of the pension
reform seems to depend, among other factors on the level of development of the domestic
capital market.
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Table 1: Portfolio Limits on Pension Fund Investment in Selected Asset Categories
Poland Hungary
Asset category Investment Actual port- Investment Actual port-
limits folio share limits folio share
Equity 40.00 31.57 50.00 9.68
Real Estate 0.00 0.00 5.00 directly, 0.00
10.00 together
with real estate
investment
funds
Government bonds No Limit 63.79 No Limit 75.20
Investment Funds 25.00 0.32 50.00 6.43
Loans Equal to the 0.13 0.00 0.00
investment in
the shares of
the borrower
Bank Deposits 20.00 3.03 No Limit 0.00
Foreign Assets 5.00 0.57 30.00 N.A.
Note: The table shows the quantitative investment limits and actual shares of assets
in the portfolio for Polish and Hungarian pension funds, indicated as % of the pension
funds’ investment portfolios. The quantitative investment restrictions refer to 2006
for Polish mandatory (open) pension funds and to 2004 for Hungarian mandatory
pension funds (OECD (2006)). The actual shares of assets in the portfolios of Polish
pension funds are calculated using data provided by www.knf.gov.pl. The shares of
assets in Hungarian pension funds portfolios are calculated using the arithmetic
average for all pension funds for the period of 1998 to 2004 given in the dataset
provided by the PSZAF. Data on investments in foreign assets by Hungarian pension
funds is not available.
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Table 2: Sharpe- and Treynor-Ratios of Polish Pension Funds
Sharpe Ratio Treynor Ratio
Market Share Value Rank WIG20 Rank WIG Rank
(A) Survived Pension Funds
Commercial Union 26.65% 0.1628 6 0.0589 7 0.0531 7
ING NNP 23.44% 0.1675 5 0.0599 6 0.0549 4
PZU 13.73% 0.1709 3 0.0621 3 0.0543 5
AIG 8.29% 0.1425 12 0.0502 12 0.0457 12
AXA 4.30% 0.1580 10 0.0574 8 0.0524 8
Generali 3.68% 0.1684 4 0.0609 5 0.0539 6
Nordea 3.52% 0.1750 2 0.0618 4 0.0555 3
Bankowy 3.09% 0.1027 15 0.0413 15 0.0380 15
Skarbiec Emerytura 2.52% 0.1272 13 0.0435 14 0.0417 14
Allianz Polska 2.46% 0.1531 11 0.0550 11 0.0512 9
AEGON 2.19% 0.1592 7 0.0563 9 0.0510 10
Pocztylion 2.02% 0.1250 14 0.0461 13 0.0418 13
Pekao 1.62% 0.1582 9 0.0561 10 0.0510 11
DOM 1.53% 0.1592 8 0.0677 2 0.0582 2
Polsat 0.96% 0.2278 1 0.0846 1 0.0758 1
Average 0.1572 0.0575 0.0519
(B) Discontinued Pension Funds
Arka Invesco −0.2884 20 −0.1255 20 −0.1192 20
Epoka −0.4007 21 −0.2343 21 −0.2240 21
Kredyt Banku −0.0306 18 −0.0114 18 −0.0104 18
Rodzina 0.0363 16 0.0270 16 0.0214 16
ego −0.0207 17 −0.0073 17 −0.0069 17
Pioneer −0.0523 19 −0.0502 19 −0.0402 19
Average −0.1261 −0.0670 −0.0632
(C) All Pension Funds
Average 0.0762 0.0219 0.0190
Note: The longest sample period is June 30 1999 until August 31 2007. Survivors are sorted
according to their market share in August 31 2007. For the calculation of the Treynor Ratios
the capitalization-weighted market indices (based on the WIG20 and the WIG, respectively,
and on the MSCI bond index) are used as market portfolios.
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Table 3: Sharpe- and Treynor-Ratios of Hungarian Pension Funds
Sharpe Ratio Treynor Ratio
Value Rank BUX Rank
All pension funds
1 −0.3349 1 0.2116 9
2 −0.9032 12 −0.7009 14
3 −2.4869 18 2.5344 4
4 −0.6509 6 0.3723 8
5 −0.7673 9 −0.5778 13
6 −0.7737 10 −0.3244 11
7 −0.5448 4 0.5362 7
8 −1.1744 13 0.6645 5
9 −0.6757 7 0.5609 6
10 −1.5921 15 −1.0578 15
11 −0.8883 11 −7.6379 18
12 −0.5967 5 2.9225 2
13 −0.3686 3 2.8171 3
14 −0.3400 2 0.1316 10
15 −1.2894 14 −2.7746 17
16 −1.5941 16 2.9549 1
17 −0.7616 8 −0.4355 12
18 −1.9346 17 −2.2627 16
Average −0.9821 −0.1147
Note: The longest sample period is 1998q1
until 2004q4. All pension funds are consid-
ered. For the calculation of the Treynor ra-
tio the capitalization-weighted market index
(based on BUX and MSCI-bond index) is
used as market portfolio.
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Table 4: Pooled Estimates for the CAPM-Based Models for Polish Pension Funds
α β γ
(A) All Pension Funds
WIG20 Jensen 0.0294∗∗∗ 0.9975∗∗∗
Treynor-Mazuy 0.0326∗∗∗ 0.9963∗∗∗ −0.0267
Henriksson-Merton 0.0346∗∗∗ 0.9780∗∗∗ −0.0383
WIG Jensen 0.0120 0.9856∗∗∗
Treynor-Mazuy 0.0088 0.9832∗∗∗ 0.0300
Henriksson-Merton 0.0156 0.9735∗∗∗ −0.0308
(B) Survived Pension Funds
WIG20 Jensen 0.0318∗∗∗ 0.9950∗∗∗
Treynor-Mazuy 0.0330∗∗∗ 0.9946∗∗∗ −0.0104
Henriksson-Merton 0.0338∗∗∗ 0.9877∗∗∗ −0.0144
WIG Jensen 0.0130 0.9783∗∗∗
Treynor-Mazuy 0.0096 0.9724∗∗∗ 0.0380
Henriksson-Merton 0.0123 0.9807∗∗∗ 0.0054
(C) Discontinued Pension Funds
WIG20 Jensen 0.0075 0.7829∗∗∗
Treynor-Mazuy 0.0234 0.8035∗∗∗ −0.1241
Henriksson-Merton 0.035 0.6928∗∗∗ −0.1983
WIG Jensen 0.0022 0.8928∗∗∗
Treynor-Mazuy 0.0131 0.9135∗∗∗ −0.1139
Henriksson-Merton 0.0278 0.7972∗∗∗ −0.2241
Note: The table presents the pooled OLS estimates of the CAPM
regressions. The market factor used is capitalization-weighted and
based on the WIG20 and the WIG as equity-market benchmarks
and the MSCI-bond index as a benchmark for government bonds.
The models are augmented by interaction dummies capturing time-
variability in beta coefficients. All models are estimated with
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. The partitioning into groups is the
following: In (A) all funds are included, in (B) only survived funds
including late-starters are considered and in (C) only funds that
started their activity later than June 1999 and quit the market
prior to July 2005 are considered. *,**,*** represent estimates sig-
nificant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The estimated dummy-
coefficients are not reported, but available upon request.
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Table 5: Pooled Estimates for the CAPM-Based Models for Hungarian Pension Funds
α β γ
(A) All Pension Funds
BUX Jensen −0.0517∗∗∗ 0.0280
Treynor-Mazuy −0.0590∗∗∗ 0.0437∗∗ 0.6233∗∗∗
Henriksson-Merton −0.0615∗∗∗ 0.1966∗∗ 0.2249
Note: The table presents the pooled estimation results of the
CAPM-models for the Hungarian pension funds. The market
factor used is a capitalization-weighted combination of bond and
equity benchmarks. BUX index is used as the benchmark for
equity market, while the local MSCI-bond index is used as a
benchmark for the bond market. The models are augmented
by interaction dummies capturing time-variability in beta coef-
ficients. All models are estimated with Driscoll-Kraay standard
errors.*,**,*** represent estimates significant at 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively. The estimated dummy-coefficients are not re-
ported, but available upon request.
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